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Redesigning the Commercial
Organization of CSX:
An Organizational Portfolio Analysis
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, CSX reorganized its merchandise
commercial group to provide a foundation for
aggressive revenue growth and increased
market share.  Over the last 20 years, railroad
companies have frequently used changes in
organization structure as one of the tools to
help them better explore business models and
exploit the opportunities presented by de-
regulation, consolidation, and technology.
The purpose of this paper is to explain
CSX’s major commercial reorganization
restructuring in 2001, and how it was
optimized by the use of organizational
portfolio analysis (OPA).
ORGANIZATIONAL  REDESIGN
The optimal structure for a company’s
organization depends on the interconnections
and interactions among its component parts,
i.e., its different business units and their
markets.  These interconnections have internal
and external dimensions.  The internal
interconnection is the interdependence among
the day-to-day activities required to manage
In 2001, CSX Corporation (CSX) reorganized the structure of its merchandise commercial
group from separate groups managing each commodity-based line of business to a more
functionally structured organization.  The move was intended to provide greater controls and
expertise required to compete successfully in a new, post-merger environment.  This paper
details the former and redesigned organizational structure of CSX’s railroad business.  It also
describes the study and analytic techniques used to support the change.  Organizational Portfolio
Analysis is used to examine the interconnections among the external markets and the
performance fluctuations of each line of business, in order to better comprehend management’s
challenges, as well as to examine the internal interconnections among the lines of businesses
to distinguish between areas of autonomy and synergy.
by Larry A. Shughart and Lex Donaldson
the lines of business or the common responses
that may be implemented as a result of
changes to external conditions (Thompson,
1967).  For example, two business units
within a company may be internally inter-
dependent because they share the same inputs
or operational equipment.  Business units
within a company may be externally inter-
dependent because they serve related or
complementary markets.  Market fluctuations
may be synchronized or countercyclical to the
performance fluctuation of the company as a
whole.  These internal and external connec-
tions influence a company’s organizational
design as company leaders seek to structure
their businesses in a way that best equips
managers to meet the day-to-day challenges
that result from the internal and external
connections.
Where two business units of a cor-
poration are interdependent, there are likely
to be gains in economies of scale by com-
bining them under one organization with
shared functions, such as marketing, sales,
customer service, etc. (Rumelt, 1974).  Where
two business units are independent, they will
likely gain focus, innovation, speed, and
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customer responsiveness by being separated
into different divisions (Galbraith, 1973).
However, many companies have business
units that are at intermediate levels of
interdependence, i.e., their businesses are
related in that they share either inputs,
operational equipment, operational personnel,
technology, etc.  At this intermediate level of
interdependence, the owning company has a
choice of whether to adopt a functional or
divisional organization structure.  Where a
company wishes to minimize costs and gain
other benefits of strong functional controls,
it should adopt the functional structure at the
highest levels of the organization, i.e., the
whole company (Donaldson, 1985).  The
company can also design more subtle organi-
zational structures at lower levels in the
hierarchy (Corey and Star, 1971).  Thus,
within a part of the company, a more func-
tional or more divisional design may be used
to increase effectiveness and match the level
of interdependence and strategic thrust.
OPA is a useful tool for investigating the
external interconnections among different
business lines of a company (Donaldson,
1999).  As supply and demand fluctuates over
time in each market, each business line will
show fluctuations in performance.  Sharply
fluctuating performance creates challenges for
the business managers striving to deliver
consistent and improving results from year to
year.  Managers will make changes to adapt
their business line to a changing environment.
The performance fluctuation from one
business unit may synchronize with that of
the other business unit in a company.  The
result is fluctuating performance for the
company as a whole, which interferes with
management’s ability to deliver consistent
results.  Thus, a company’s organization can
be viewed as being a portfolio of business
lines, each with distinct performance fluc-
tuations.  OPA examines the degree of
performance fluctuation for each business line
relative to the company’s performance fluc-
tuation.  The analysis also quantifies the
degree to which a business line performance
is synchronized with the company’s overall
performance and uses that index as an input
to the analysis.
OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS
In finance, portfolio theory holds that the
variance (i.e., fluctuation over time) of the
performance of a set of stocks in a portfolio
is determined by the variance in the price of
each stock and also the covariance between
them (Brealey and Myers, 1996).  Stocks with
larger variances have less dependable returns
and thus a higher risk. Conversely, stocks with
lower variances have returns that are more
dependable and are less risky.
A company’s organization can likewise
be seen as a portfolio. It contains a number of
assets, each with its own returns, risks, and
correlations with the other assets, which
interact to produce overall return and risk for
the company (Amihud and Lev, 1981;
Hoskisson, 1987; Miller and Leiblein, 1996).
Organizational portfolio theory holds that the
fluctuation in the performance of an organi-
zation is determined by the fluctuation in the
performance of its business lines (e.g.,
divisions) and the correlations between them
(Donaldson, 1999, 2000).  The degree of
fluctuation in the performance of the entire
company may be termed the organizational
risk, and the degree of performance fluctua-
tion of a division may be termed the divisional
risk (Donaldson, 1999) because these fluc-
tuations indicate the dependability of profit
or returns.
Finance assesses risk by using the beta
coefficient to measure the degree to which a
stock fluctuates in its value over time relative
to the fluctuations in the value of the stock
market (Brealey and Myers, 1996).
Analogously, organizational portfolio theory
proposes the concept of a divisional beta
coefficient as being the degree of fluctuation
in the profitability of a division relative to the
fluctuation in profitability of the company
over the same period (Donaldson, 1999).
Thus, by examining the beta coefficient of
each business line, OPA can illuminate the risk
profile of each business line.
OPA can also be applied to assess the
adaptability of individual business lines.
Research has shown that organizations which
need to make adaptive changes to fit within
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their environmental situation often fail to do
so until their performance drops to a low crisis
level (Chandler, 1962; Ezzamel and Hilton,
1980; Donaldson, 2001).  Thus, OPA posits
that a division whose performance does not
periodically fluctuate to low levels may
remain maladapted and so be suboptimal
because crisis does not occur (Donaldson,
1999).  In contrast, fluctuating divisional
performance facilitates divisional adaptation,
leading to long-term growth and success.  A
similar effect applies for the corporation, in
that corporate performance fluctuations drive
corporate-level change.  Corporate perform-
ance fluctuations (i.e., organizational risk)
arise from the fluctuations of its divisions (i.e.,
divisional risk) and their correlations,
whereby positively correlating divisional
fluctuations reinforce each other and nega-
tively correlating divisional fluctuations
counteract each other.  Using the beta
coefficient measure, OPA can be used to
assess a business line’s propensity to become
suboptimal rather than to adapt.  In addition,
by revealing the similarity or difference
between the performance fluctuations of
business lines, the OPA gives information
about the degree to which the dynamics of
various business lines are similar or different.
This comparison of business-line perform-
ance adds to the information available from
more conventional operations/management-
type analyses of common resources, tech-
nologies, etc., in assessing whether businesses
should be combined or kept separate.  Furthe-
rmore, by examining the extent to which the
performance fluctuation of each business line
is synchronized with that of the company as a
whole, OPA can shed light on the nature of
the challenges posed to management.
As a result, OPA can be used to make
recommendations about the organizational
structure of a company based on the analysis
of its separate business lines. Using the results
of OPA, a company may conclude that a
business line exhibiting high volatility is
relatively adaptive and so should be main-
tained as a separate unit; business lines that
are highly synchronized may benefit from
merging and sharing functional resources.
Thus, this paper focuses on reporting the
results attained in deploying OPA to a railroad
company case and on how the results were
used by the company to help guide its
reorganization.  The information is being
shared in the hope that other companies and
organizations may use OPA as a tool to help
them in their endeavors.
Organizational portfolio theory is one of
some complexity (Donaldson, 1999), and a
thorough study would involve considering a
wider set of variables than those considered
in this paper.  Similarly, organizational
portfolio theory entails many propositions and
hypotheses (Donaldson, 1999, 2000).  This
paper is not a test of the theory; however, it
presents the first operational case study and
empirical exploration of two of the key
concepts of organizational portfolio theory:
the business line beta coefficient and the
synchronization between the performance
fluctuations of the business lines and the
company.  This paper, therefore, is a necessary
step in the evolution of organizational
portfolio theory research, focusing on the
application of the idea of an organizational
portfolio to a specific company case.
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNOF
THECSX RAILROAD1
Applying the concepts of interconnections to
railroading reveals interdependent opera-
tions.  A common set of trains and cars operate
on a single set of tracks connecting geo-
graphically diverse customers.  Railroad
operations are run in one integrated organi-
zational structure that is internally specialized
by function.  However, while the core of
operations has this unitary characteristic, the
external connections the company faces with
its customers and markets are very diverse.
Consequently, railroad corporations generally
have functionally designed operating depart-
ments while the organizations that interface
with the customers tend more toward divi-
sions by markets.  An examination of “The
Pocket List of Railroad Officials,”2 an industry
directory of railroad managers for all North
American Railroads, shows the vast majority
of operating department leaders have titles
such as “VP Locomotives,” “VP Engi-
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neering,” “VP Terminals,” etc.  Conversely,
railroad commercial department leaders have
titles such as “VP Coal,” “VP Merchandise,”
“VP Intermodal,” etc.
However, there are some types of activity
that are less connected to the core railroad.
These operations can be structured more
autonomously, introducing a greater degree
of divisionalization.  CSX exploited this
model in their creation of business units  (i.e.,
divisions) in the early 1990s.  Separate
business units were charged with managing
costs, revenue, and to some extent, the
overhead and strategy associated with four
major CSX markets:  phosphate/fertilizer,
intermodal, automobile, and coal.  The other
CSX markets are characterized as having
single-car shipments that move together
through the railroad network.  These smaller
markets are collectively termed merchandise
and are essentially the core railroad.
OVERVIEW OF CSX MARKETS
Before applying OPA to the CSX case, it is
important to understand the different com-
modity markets and business lines that make
up the CSX portfolio.  Variations in perfor-
mance of each of the businesses may be
attributed to changes in the external market,
changes in competitors’ strategies, and the
responses of the business managers to those
challenges.  Later in the analysis, we will
quantify the divisional beta for each of the
CSX business lines, recognizing that the
performance results represent a combination
of both the exogenous market influences and
the internal management responses.
In the following overview of the CSX
business lines, we characterize the inter-
dependence of each business line with the
core network and note the external market
trends.
Fertilizer Business Unit (FBU). Formed
in 1992 to serve the phosphate and fertilizer
market using dedicated tracks and equipment
in Florida’s Bone Valley, the FBU transported
phosphate rock from the mines to Tampa’s
export docks or to local factories that process
the raw material into agricultural fertilizer.
The concentration of assets, customers, and
traffic flows in a small area created a unique
opportunity within CSX to isolate a piece of
the business and promote an entrepreneurial
zeal similar to that demonstrated by short line
railroads.
Intermodal Business Unit (CSXI). The
CSXI business unit managed the trans-
portation of truck trailers and containers on
flat cars, a distinct market from the rest of the
CSX railroad.  CSXI possesses terminal and
equipment assets that are solely dedicated to
its operations.  While it did use the core
railroad tracks and locomotives, CSXI had
distinct operations and personnel, so that
some aspects of the business unit were not
highly interdependent with the core.  Further,
CSXI had distinct customers with special
needs.  Hence, the interdependence of CSXI
with the core railroad was only intermediate.
In order to gain benefits, such as respon-
siveness to customers, it was strategically
appropriate to constitute CSXI as a division
with its own management and profit center in
1987.  CSXI operating functions included
terminals, car management, service design,
network operations, and customer service.
Additionally, CSXI contained its own
adminis-trative functions of finance, law,
human resources, and planning.  Thus, CSXI
was able to act with considerable autonomy
and was held accountable as a profit center
with its own profit and loss statement.
Automotive Business Unit (ABU). The
automotive business line includes the trans-
portation of finished autos, trucks, and SUVs,
and the transportation of parts and sub-
assemblies from the point of manufacture to
the final assembly plant.  The business unit
was much like CSXI in design, in that it had
terminal assets and rail cars, but no line-haul
routes.  ABU organizationally was a division
with its own management and income state-
ment.  In addition to having its own sales and
marketing functions, the ABU included
operating functions, such as car management,
service design, operations staff, and terminals.
Coal Business Unit. The coal business
unit (COBU) was implemented soon after the
evident success of the FBU.  While it was on
a much larger scale than the FBU, the COBU
was designed to closely link commercial and
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operating functions and decision making
around the common goal of maximizing the
profit of the coal business.  The COBU assets
included the routes of the former C&O
Railroad (now owned by CSX) as well as
tracks, terminals, and piers.
Unlike the FBU where more than 95%
of the traffic was in the phosphate and
fertilizer market, the COBU had a sig-nificant
amount of non-coal traffic in its territory.  In
addition, most of the utility coal and industrial
coal destinations were located outside of the
COBU territory.  The COBU management
team was regularly challenged by the need to
balance the needs of the non-coal businesses
against its mandate to maximize the profit of
the coal operations.  In addition, the COBU
managers had to influence the operations
managers on the core network to give good
service to the coal trains once the trains left
the COBU territory.  The COBU was not
entirely success-ful, as might have been
predicted from its greater interde-pendence
with the rest of the railroad.
The Merchandise Commodities. There
are seven business lines that constitute mer-
chandise:
1. Chemicals line: raw materials and
intermediates.
2. Paper and forest line: pulp wood, paper,
plywood, paneling, and lumber.
3. Minerals line: stone and aggregate used
in construction.
4. Metals line: scrap and intermediate
products moving to and from steel mills.
5. Agriculture line: grain, feed ingredients,
vegetable oil, corn sweeteners, etc.
6. Food and Consumer line: perishable fruits,
vegetables, appliances, and other manu-
factured goods.
7. Government line: specialized moves of
ammunition and explosives, rocket
motors, and tanks.
For the most part, merchandise com-
modities move as carload freight.  The rail
cars all share common local trains, classi-
fication yards, and through trains.  However,
when volume warrants, or when customers are
willing to pay a premium for better service,
pieces of the business will move in dedicated
unit trains, which nevertheless move on the
unified track system and use common equip-
ment.  Thus, railroad operations in the
merchandise commodities are highly inter-
dependent with each other and together
represent CSX’s core operation.  Accordingly,
the merchandise organization is geared toward
providing the least autonomy for each
commodity.
Before 1998, the merchandise business
lines were managed as a single commercial
entity with its own sales and marketing
managers.  Unlike the other business units,
merchandise did not have its own operating
function or its own administrative functions.
Each commodity group contained a mixture
of sales and marketing personnel.  Over time,
different roles blended to the point where
some individuals handled all pricing, mar-
keting, and sales decisions for specific
customers and/or specific segments of a
market.  This structure was oriented toward
flexibility in dealing with the sales-marketing
idiosyncrasies of each commodity and its
market.  However, disadvantages included a
lack of overhead cost control because of loss
of scale economies and a lack of strong
functional disciplinary inputs into decision-
making, such as future growth strategies and
pricing.3
CONRAIL ACQUISITION AND
SERVICE GROUPS
With the advent of the Conrail Merger in
1998,4 the merchandise business lines, along
with the FBU were formed into the Merchan-
dise Service Group, containing the operating
functions of customer service, car manage-
ment, service design, and an operations staff.
It also became accountable for profit with its
own income statement.  This reorganization
made merchandise a division equal to inter-
modal, auto, and coal, with the potential to
be more autonomous than it had been.  The
latter three business units, already rather
autonomous, were given even more inde-
pendent authority and renamed as service
groups as well.  However, the service group
structure did not work as well at CSX as it
had at the former Conrail.
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The CSX network forms a spider web
across the entire eastern United States.  This
dense and complex network resulted in much
more interdependence of operations between
the four, rather equal, CSX service groups.
Subsequent management challenges that
resulted from the internal conflicts between
the service groups contributed to deterioration
in service and a dramatic increase in railroad
congestion.5
COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION
STUDY
In July 2001, CSX leaders looked to reorgani-
zation as a potential tool to improve the
effectiveness of the business line managers:
internally, as the business leaders struggled
with the reality of the integrated railroad
operations; and externally, as they interfaced
with markets, customers, and competition.  A
formal study team was commissioned with the
charge of scientifically assessing commercial
organization alternatives. CSX executives
wanted to better understand commercial
employee management strategies, perfor-
mance measures, and process differences that
may contribute to the design of organizations.
Furthermore, the leaders stressed that the
analysis should contain both empirical and
quantitative assessments to avoid a change-
for-change-sake situation.
Detailed organizational benchmarking
studies of two other Class I railroads, two
major trucking companies, two CSX sup-
pliers, and two CSX customers led the team
to conclude that the group of non-rail
companies had much more functional organi-
zations than typical in the railroad industry.
Table 1 summarizes the differences in
structure between the rail and non-rail
companies included in the benchmarking
study.
For the non-rail companies, each func-
tional group had a singular mission and was
staffed by experts in that activity.  There was
clear delineation between marketing, pricing,
sales, and post-sales customer service.  This
division of duties allowed people to focus on
their respective parts of the commercial
equation and exploit their talents without
having to be distracted by other responsi-
bilities.6 With the empirical evidence pointing
to the possibility of a more functional
organization at CSX, the study team turned
to OPA to validate that assertion with a quanti-
tative analysis.
Category Rail Companies Non-rail Companies 
 
Pricing Authority 
 
Collaborative, consensus 
decision 
 
Strong, central authority 
 
Roles & Responsibilities 
 
Sales-marketing-pricing 
roles are blended 
 
Different functional roles are 
clearly defined 
 
Field vs. Headquarters 
 
Small field staff 
 
Large field presence 
 
Sales and Marketing Staff 
 
Relatively fewer 
 
Relatively more 
 
Growth Actual & Expected 
 
None – Marginal 
 
8% – 10% 
Table 1: Differences in Organizational Structure Found as a Result of Benchmarking
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APPLICATION  OF
ORGANIZATIONAL PORTFOLIO
ANALYSIS  AT  CSX
CSX applied OPA by viewing CSX as a
portfolio comprising 15 business lines.  The
fluctuation of the performance of each
business line was compared with that of the
whole company to understand the perfor-
mance dynamics of the portfolio and its parts.
The line of business (LOB) beta coefficient
captured the degree of fluctuation of the
performance of each business line relative to
the overall railroad company’s performance.
Organizational portfolio theory uses the
performance variable crucial to the manage-
ment of the company; the metric that drives
managers’ decision making.  Typically, if this
performance variable drops below the satis-
factory, i.e., acceptable level, management
perceives a problem and takes action (Simon,
1976). In many companies, the key perform-
ance variable is profit.  At CSX, operating
profit of the different business lines is
measured by contribution. Contribution is
total revenue less long-term variable costs
(i.e., costs directly attributable to a business
line).  CSX internal costing systems include
directly associated costs to each specific
move: fuel, switching, and car rents.  Eco-
nomic costs, such as equipment wear and tear,
track degradation, and train crews are also
deducted.  Some indirect costs are included
in the contribution calculation as factors that
are derived from allocating the total cost of
those support functions to the various moves.
Examples of allocated costs include customer
service, technology, and accounting.  In total,
70% of the total CSX cost structure is deemed
variable and attached to the specific revenue
moves.  Previous internal CSX analysis
concluded that total CSX contribution had a
correlation coefficient of 0.93 with net
operating income over a 10-year period.
Contribution is a major factor affecting
decision making by CSX management;
Contribution is measured for each year, and
therefore, despite the existence of seasonal
or quarterly fluctuations and changes in
annual performance, annual contribution was
the appropriate focus for the CSX OPA.
Contribution statistics are well understood by
all CSX constituents, accepted as a credible
measure of performance, and consistently
calculated over time.  They are not affected
by special charges, the status of the ratio of
debt to equity, or other external impacts to
the corporate income statement.
We measured the LOB beta coefficient
for each CSX business line by comparing
fluctuations in that line’s contribution over
1997 to 2001 relative to fluctuations in total
company contribution over the same five-year
period.  We first regressed the contribution
of a business line against the total contribution
of the company to find the slope coefficient.
This coefficient gives the sensitivity of
changes over time in business-line contri-
bution relative to changes in company
contribution.  Because total company contri-
bution is much greater than the contribution
of any single business line, these variables
have different scales.  Therefore, if only the
slope coefficient was used as the LOB beta
coefficient, the measure would be a small
decimal figure lacking intuitive meaning.  For
example, the agriculture business line
contribution represents around 5% of the
company contribution resulting in agriculture
having a small decimal slope coefficient.  To
correct for the scale difference, the five years
of data (for each business line contribution
and company contribution) were re-expressed
as variations about their respective means.
This could have been done by dividing each
annual observation by the mean for that
variable and then entering it into the regres-
sion.  However, a mathematically equivalent
procedure is to take the slope coefficient of
businesses line contribution on company
contribution from the regression, and then
multiply it by the ratio of the means of
company contribution and business line
contribution.  The latter procedure has the
benefit of rendering the LOB beta coefficient
as a number that ranges around one.  If, over
the five years, the degree of fluctuation of a
business line’s contribution (relative to its
mean) was the same magnitude as the degree
of fluctuation of company contribution
(relative to its mean), then the LOB beta
coefficient would have the value of 1.0 as,
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for example, is the case for agriculture
business line.
Moreover, because business lines differ
in the magnitudes of their contributions, their
slope coefficients would not be readily
comparable with each other, which would
vitiate a major objective of the analysis.  For
example, the slope coefficient of chemicals
is 0.170, which is three times greater than the
slope coefficient of agriculture (0.059).
However, this difference is due to the greater
magnitude of chemicals’ contribution, which
is about three times that of agriculture.  In
finance, risk is variation about the mean
(Brealey and Myers, 1996), which controls
for differences in magnitude (i.e., scale).
Similarly, we are seeking to measure volatility
around the mean, rather than the raw
magnitude of changes.  When chemicals’
contribution is re-expressed relative to its
mean, the variation in its annual contributions
is 21%, which is similar to that of agriculture,
23%.  Hence, removing scale differences,
chemicals is about the same volatility as
agriculture. When the slope coefficient is
corrected for scale differences, the LOB beta
coefficient for chemicals is 1.0.  This shows
that chemicals has the same sensitivity relative
to fluctuations in company contribution as has
agriculture, which also has a LOB beta
coefficient of 1.0.  Thus, by standardizing for
scale differences, the beta coefficients of the
lines of business become comparable.
Since the coefficient is a measure of
relative fluctuation, it is consequently a
measure of relative risk.  Since it is similar to
a ratio, with the fluctuations for the business
unit in the numerator and the company as a
whole in the denominator, an LOB beta
coefficient of 1.0 indicates that the business
market has the same level of risk as the
company.
An LOB beta coefficient of more than
1.0 indicates that the business line’s contri-
bution fluctuates more than that of the
company as a whole.  This implies that the
business line is more likely to adapt to market
conditions (since fluctuating performance
promotes adaptation) but that it is riskier than
the company as a whole.  Also if the synchro-
nization index, as defined below, is non-
trivially positive, then the line is likely to be
missing opportunities to reduce costs through
synergies with other divisions. A tradeoff may
have to be made between maintaining
adaptability by remaining as a separate unit
and taking advantage of economies of scale
by combining with another business line.
An LOB beta coefficient of less than 1.0
indicates that the business line is less risky
than the company, so that the business line is
decreasing the overall risk of the company.
However, because of its limited fluctuations
in performance, as noted above, it is more
likely to remain maladapted to external market
conditions.
The synchronization index (SI) captures
the degree to which a business line’s contri-
bution fluctuates in synchronization with, and
therefore reinforces, the contribution fluc-
tuations of the whole company.7 To compare
the fluctuations in the contributions of a
business line, the contribution for each year
is divided by the mean over the five-year
period for that business line and expressed as
a percentage, e.g., the mean level is 100%.
The SI is the degree of positive correlation
between the business line’s and company’s
contributions.  A negative SI signifies that the
business line’s contribution is countercyclical
to that of the company.
For calculating the LOB beta coefficient,
at least several years of data are required to
capture fluctuations over time in business line
contribution and company contribution.
However, it would be inappropriate to use too
long a time period because the beta coefficient
would no longer hold since the sensitivity of
the fluctuations in business line contribution
to fluctuations of company contribution may
have shifted.  For this analysis, we were
restricted to using at most five years of data.
Each year, CSX restates contribution figures
for the previous five years using the current
year’s cost basis in order to have a database
of comparable statistics to support a variety
of trend analyses.
Redesigning the Commercial Organization of CSX
77
CSX OPA CASE STUDY RESULTS
Table 2 reports the results of the organi-
zational portfolio analysis, listing each of the
15 business lines’ LOB beta coefficient and
synchronization index.  Within merchandise,
the metals and minerals business lines both
have low LOB beta coefficients of 0.4; paper
has a coefficient of 0.5.  The contributions of
these three commodities only fluctuate about
half as much as the company overall.
Similarly, the phosphates and fertilizers (PF)
business line has a very low LOB beta
coefficient, 0.2.  Thus, four of the eight
merchandise service group commodities have
low contribution volatility.  The fluctuation
in contribution over the five-year period from
1997 to 2001 is shown for metals, as
compared with the whole company, in Figure
1.  It can be seen that metal’s contribution is
more stable than that of the company.
Agriculture and chemicals both have
LOB beta coefficients of 1.0 and so their
contributions fluctuate to the same degree as
the company overall.
Only two merchandise lines of business
have LOB beta coefficients of more than 1.0:
food and consumer has a coefficient of 2.1
and government 2.5, indicating that their
annual contribution fluctuates over twice as
much as the company overall.
As a group, the merchandise lines of
business would be classified by organizational
portfolio theory as “stability leading to lack
of adaptation” (Donaldson, 1999); meaning
that, due to the relatively stable contribution
levels, corporate-level management will tend
to overlook problems in these business lines
and neglect to induce changes that lead to
adaptation.
This view is reinforced by the fact that
the fluctuations in the performances of the
merchandise lines of business are synchro-
nized with the performance of the company
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Table 2:  Results of Organizational
Portfolio Analysis
Business Units and 
Lines 
LOB Beta 
Coefficient 
Synchronization 
Index 
   
Merchandise  
Metals 0 4 +0 82 
Minerals 0 4 +0 60 
Paper 0 5 +0 77 
Phosphate 0 2 -0 44 
Agriculture 1 0 +0 95 
Chemicals 1 0 +0 96 
Food & Consumer 2 1 +0 95 
Government 2 5 +0 95 
   
Intermodal  
Premium 5 5 +0 98 
International 3 3 +0 95 
Domestic 2 5 +0 65 
   
Automobile 2 6 +0 97 
   
Coal   
Export 1 9 -0 89 
Industrial 0 1 -0 25 
Utility 0 8 +0 75 
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as a whole.  With the exception of the
phosphate/fertilizer business line, the mer-
chandise lines all have substantial positive
synchronization indices, ranging from +0.60
(minerals) to +0.96 (chemicals).  Therefore,
when any one business line has low per-
formance, the company as a whole would also,
so that unsatisfactory company performance
would spur corporate leaders to prompt
remedial action in the business lines.
The merchandise business lines are all
positively inter-correlated (mean of +0.72
with the exception of the phosphate/fertilizer
market).  Therefore, almost all the commodi-
ties (seven out of eight) would have low-
performing years if the company were in a
low-performing year.  As a result, the leader
of the merchandise group would have to deal
with seven ill-performing business lines
simultaneously.  Given the bounded ration-
ality of managers (Simon, 1976), i.e.,
limitations of time, energy and knowledge, the
merchandise leader would be unable to
intervene productively in all these commod-
ities.  Therefore, the low and synchronized
volatility of the business lines rendered them
prone to maladaptation, as was evidenced by
the problems with suboptimal marketing,
pricing, and market innovation revealed by
the qualitative analyses.
As a result of the study team’s findings
(low volatility and high synchronization),
CSX decided to reorganize the merchandise
lines around a more functional organization.
Instead of each manager dealing with a single
commodity but expecting to be an expert in
all facets of the commercial relationship, each
manager would now deal with a diverse array
of commodities by specializing on one aspect
of the business, i.e. marketing, sales, pricing,
customer service, etc.  It was hoped that each
manager would become more productive and
effective as they specialized by work activity.
It was expected that the merchandise business
lines would be less prone to maladaptation as
they were supported by stronger functional
capabilities.
As explained in more detail below,
analysis of the intermodal and automotive
business lines revealed high volatility and
positive synchronization across the two
divisions.  This indicated that CSX would
benefit by combining them into one unit
organized in a more functional structure.
The coal division, however, was found
to have an intermediate level of volatility and
varying synchronization across its three
business lines, indicating that it already
exhibited the appropriate level of autonomy
and that it would be most beneficial to
maintain its organizational structure.
CSX REDESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION
Overall, CSX retained the divisional aspects
of its structure, in that the intermodal, coal,
and merchandise business lines remained in
existence.  The automotive business lines
were grouped with the intermodal business
lines because of their high synchronization.
Merchandise was reorganized from being
internally specialized by commodities to being
organized by functions in order to make it less
prone to maladaptation.  On Oct. 24, 2001,
CSX announced a new organization structure
for its merchandise group.  The new structure
aligned employees around their functional
duties rather than their market specialties.
Recall that the old organization held leaders
responsible for all aspects of a commodity
group: sales, marketing, pricing, planning,
forecasting, etc.  The new organization had
seven vice presidents each assigned to a
separate function: core sales, field sales,
system marketing, emerging markets, pricing
and yield management, market performance,
and process transformation.  Operational,
service design, equipment, and overhead
activity were turned back over to the central
operating functions.
The OPA showed CSX executives that
aligning talent by function rather than by
commodity would give customers the benefit
of an account team made up of experts at their
respective responsibilities rather than multi-
tasking individuals.  The realignment of the
sales support functions was designed to
release the sales force to spend more time
addressing customer needs and designing
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cost-effective transportation solutions.8  As
demonstrated in the benchmarking study, the
sales team was divided between a centrally
located group focused on managing the largest
accounts, while the field sales team was
responsible for small, medium, and new
accounts.  Sales people at CSX became
focused solely on selling value; selling rail
logistics solutions; managing a major cus-
tomer set; and identifying, cold-calling, and
converting new non-rail customers.
The process transformation function was
designated as the commercial representative
and clearing house for all of the activity
associated with cross-departmental strategy
and improvement teams that distract resources
and focus away from the day-to-day duties of
sales and marketing.  Designating one group
to lead all of these efforts also ensured
consistency, continuity, and proper trade-offs
among all of the competing technologies and
constituencies.  The process transformation
group was also charged with the training and
development of the commercial staff as they
entered new roles and employed new
processes.
Pricing responsibility was given to a
separate group responsible for maximizing
yield and contribution.  This group was to
manage strategy development and execution
for price in close coordination with sales and
marketing.  The pricing team was given clear
expectations by senior management, including
implementing strategies to maximize price,
persuading the organization to take risk,
simplifying current price models, engaging
interline partners, and developing yield
strategies to maximize revenue.
The system marketing group needed to
develop fundamental skills and processes that
appeared to have been lost or downplayed
during successive strategy and organizational
changes.  Many of the textbook activities of a
marketing function were no longer being
executed well in the divisional structure.  CSX
leaders saw a need to improve marketing
ability to identify and prioritize growth
opportunities, develop strategies and markets,
identify and communicate value drivers, and
advertise and promote markets.
The market performance team manages
the post-sales customer experience.  The
organization included customer service and
the interface to field operations.  The goal was
to develop a “zero-defect mindset” in
operations to support growth.  This group was
to closely interact with service design and car
management, both of which were repositioned
in the organization to report to the operating
department.
CSX cordoned off several specific lines
of business due to their future growth
potential.  The resulting emerging markets
included large farm machinery, government,
municipal waste, auto shred (the nonmetallic
refuse resulting from recycling old auto-
mobiles), and the rock runners (short haul unit
trains of aggregates previously handled in the
minerals group).  Cultivating business
relationships with these customers involves
commercial, environmental, industry, muni-
cipal, and regulatory expertise not usually
encountered in traditional rail transportation.
To be successful, the emerging markets unit
was designed to be entrepreneurial and high-
growth oriented, with a goal to significantly
increase market share.
The OPA found that, in contrast to the
merchandise business lines, intermodal
contribution was highly volatile, as indicated
by the high LOB beta coefficients of its three
business lines all being much greater than 1.0:
2.5 (domestic), 3.3 (international) and 5.5
(premium).  Figure 2 shows the fluctuations
of contribution of the intermodal premium
business line compared with the whole
company.  It can be seen that intermodal
premium’s contribution is much more volatile
than that of the company.  Moreover, the
performances of the three intermodal business
lines are highly correlated with each other
(mean inter-correlation of +0.83), so that they
reinforce each other.  Therefore, CSXI’s
performance fluctuates much more than that
of the company as a whole.  Furthermore, the
performances of the intermodal business lines
are strongly synchronized with that of the
overall company, as found by their synchro-
nization indices of +0.65, +0.95 and +0.98,
respectively.  Therefore, the annual fluc-
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tuations in CSXI’s contribution are tending
to amplify those of the company and increase
its overall risk.  The great fluctuations (as
indicated by the high LOB beta coefficients),
synchronized with those in company perform-
ance (as indicated by the high SI’s),
encouraged company leaders to leave CSXI
as a separate business unit so the CSXI
managers could take adaptive action to attune
CSXI to its markets.  However, this autonomy
comes at the expense of cost-reducing
synergies within the core operations.
In the OPA terms, the automotive busi-
ness line is like the intermodal lines, in that
its contribution fluctuates greatly, with a LOB
beta coefficient of 2.6.  Moreover, the contri-
bution of the automotive business line
correlates considerably with the three inter-
modal business lines (+0.50, +0.89 and +0.93,
respectively).  Thus, the automotive line’s
contribution fluctuates in harmony with that
of the intermodal lines.  Therefore, we would
expect a combined automotive and intermodal
division to experience large fluctuations in
contribution.  The combined division would
be adaptive and benefit from sharing func-
tional resources. The nature and timing of the
performance management challenges will be
similar across the business lines, which will
assist divisional management in identifying
trends and finding commonalities in solutions.
Because there are only four business lines
involved (one automotive plus three inter-
modal), the manager in charge of the division
will face less of a bounded rationality problem
than the manager in charge of the merchandise
group, with its larger number of business
lines.  It is hoped that the risk to the company
will be reduced as the managers match
production synergies across the two business
lines to changes in market demand.
The automotive business line also shared
many operational commonalities with inter-
modal that could lead to synergies: both had
dedicated, high-speed trains, the same
equipment supplier (TTX), trucking opera-
tions, a few big customers, and dedicated and
specialized terminals.  Therefore, the study
team recommended that automobile and
intermodal should be combined into the same
division.  In order to extract the synergies,
the automotive and intermodal business lines
not only had to report to the same VP, but
also had to integrate their activities at all levels
of the hierarchy.
The study team concluded that per-
formance issues within the coal lines were not
related to the organizational structure.  While
there was some evidence that the organization
of the industrial coal business line might
benefit from being more functional (LOB beta
coefficient of 0.1 indicating low volatility),
and that the export coal line could be more
adaptive if operated as a separate unit (LOB
beta coefficient of 1.9), the utility coal line
(the largest and fastest-growing of the three
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coal lines) had a LOB beta coefficient of 0.8
which, being close to 1.0, indicated that there
already existed an appropriate degree of
autonomy in the structure of the organization.
Overall, the coal business line and the
company exhibited comparable contribution
volatility and only mildly negative synchro-
nization (an average of -0.13 across the three
coal lines) with the company as a whole,
indicating that it did not have a significant
effect in either direction on the company’s
overall adaptability.  Consequently, the study
team did not recommend changes to the coal
unit’s organization, but did point out to the
CSX leadership that the coal business
managers in the export and utility lines should
take advantage of their autonomy and adapt
more quickly and effectively to their chal-
lenges while looking for missed opportunities
to build on synergies with the industrial coal
line.9
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the qualitative and quantitative
findings of the study team, CSX adjusted its
commercial organization to better fit its
internal and external interconnections
resulting from its changed environment.  The
structure shifted toward functions in order to
deal with enhanced competition and new
opportunities.  The OPA aided CSX in its
quest to balance each division’s autonomy and
ability to adapt with its opportunity to reduce
costs.  The OPA analysis gave insight into the
underlying causes of lack of adaptation by the
merchandise business.  Further, OPA illumi-
nated the opportunity for cost synergies
between the intermodal and automotive
business lines while maintaining hyper-
vigilance regarding the environment in these
volatile markets.  The analysis highlighted real
differences between the various coal business
lines, contributing to the CSX leaders’
decision to delay organiza-tional changes in
the coal business while other performance
issues were being studied.
It is difficult to assess the beneficial result
of this reorganization.  Since the commercial
reorganization discussed in this paper
occurred, CSX’s financial performance has
lagged other railroad companies.  CSX has
changed its top levels of leadership, including
the dismissal of the head of the merchandise
group who was responsible for visioning and
implementing this study.  CSX is in the midst
of a broader corporate reorganization aimed
at reducing the number of management layers
and abolishing more than 800 positions.
Some of the complementary recommen-
dations of the study team were never imple-
mented, including the hiring of functional
experts from outside the company and
aggressively training existing commercial
managers to better equip them for their new
roles.
The automotive and intermodal business
lines remain in one organization and continue
to be integrated and combined.  The purely
functional organization of merchandise has
started to evolve back into a more divisional
structure.
However, this case study does prove that
organizational assessment need not be a
purely qualitative exercise.  Analytical
techniques can be used to provide objective
assessments of the effectiveness of different
organizational structures and suggest alter-
natives that may better suit the internal
production function and external market
conditions of a company.  While OPA may
not be a singular solution that a company
should rely on in determining the need for
reorganization, at CSX, OPA validated
qualitative findings and reassured executive
leaders that a change was warranted.
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Endnotes
1. This paper focuses solely on the commercial organization of the CSX railroad business and not
on the larger business activities of CSX Corporation.  Since 1980, CSX, more than any other railroad
company, has used organization structure as a tool to experiment with different approaches to running
a railroad business in a deregulated environment.
2. Published quarterly by Commonwealth Business Media, Inc., East Windsor, NJ
3. Prior to deregulation in 1980, railroad commercial functions were largely transaction-focused.
There were few departments or people with “marketing” in their title, job description, or duties.  The
customers interfaced with local freight agents who managed car orders, switching instructions, way
billing, and freight billing.  Sales forces were aligned geographically, with the salesperson’s primary
responsibility to maintain or increase a customer’s traffic by establishing close working relationships
and by helping the customer resolve any service problems.  There was a headquarters pricing function
that administered tariffs and represented the companies in rate bureaus.
4. CSX purchased 42% of Conrail, another Class I railroad located in the northeastern United
States, increasing the size of CSX by about one third.
5. Other merger-related challenges included computer systems integration, operations integration,
and vigorous commercial competition from the Norfolk Southern Railroad.
6. One company made it a point to discuss how sales people hired from other industries quickly
came up the learning curve and outperformed their best, internally developed sales people who had
spent an entire career at the company in a variety of different departments.  Professional salesmen
outperformed the people commonly regarded as industry experts.
7. The conclusions being drawn from an OPA must be qualified by saying that they hold given that
other relevant factors remain constant. Ceteris paribus.
8. Generally, a business downturn translates into more opportunities for railroads to capitalize on
their low rates as compared with trucks.  Customers are willing to sacrifice minimization of their long-
term economic total logistics costs for reduced short-term cash expenditures associated with
inexpensive transportation.  The improved service and lower cost (compared with trucks) created a
fertile sales environment.
9. One suggested alternative, short of an organizational restructuring of the coal market, encouraged
building a stronger relationship between industrial coal business managers and the merchandise
business managers.
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